For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.

John Wilson's work as moral educator is summarized and evaluated. His rationalist humanistic approach is based on a componential characterization of the morally educated person. Such a person consistently manifests a unity of reflection, feeling, belief, and acting under the logically structured rubrics of PHIL, EMP, GIG and KRAT, and exemplifying the formal features of 'moral opinion'. The rationale and conceptual status of the components is discussed, as is the view that the concept of education entails that teachers be (...) moral educators. This involves cultivating autonomous rationality with respect to the unconscious, motivation, day-to-day moral decision-making, and the emotions; in the latter case there are extensive applications in religious education. Finally, certain weaknesses and pre-eminent strengths of Wilson's position are indicated, and comparisons briefly made with the views of McPhail, Peters, Frankena and Kohlberg. (shrink)

This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.

Perkins, John L The atrocity of September 11 led me to become an atheist. A boundary had been crossed, I thought, and religions could no longer be regarded as benign. As the buildings crashed to the ground in New York, this conclusion seemed obvious. Yet a decade and a half later, it seems remarkable how few people have been able to reach the same conclusion.

In this bold addition to Oxford's What Everyone Needs to Know® series, John L. Esposito and Natana DeLong-Bas offer a guide to the often-discussed but seldom-understood concept of Sharia, responding to misunderstandings and distortions, as well as providing answers to questions about the origin, nature, and content of Sharia.

Perkins, John L With his regular programmes on radio and television, newspaper columns and commentary, Waleed Aly has become Australia's favourite Muslim celebrity. He is intelligent, articulate and provides incisive analysis of political and social issues. Given this, it might have been expected that he could have applied the same quality of analysis in his book, People Like Us: How Arrogance is Dividing Islam and the West (2007); however this is not the case.

Recent scholarship has inquired into the socio-historical, discursive genesis of trauma. Trauma and the Ontology of the Modern Subject, however, seeks what has not been actualized in trauma studies - that is, how the necessity and unassailable intensity of trauma is fastened to its historical emergence. We must ask not only what trauma means for the individual person's biography, but also what it means to be the historical subject of trauma. In other words, how does being human in this current (...) period of history implicate one's lived possibilities that are threatened, and perhaps framed, through trauma? Foucauldian sensibilities inform a critical and structural analysis that is hermeneutically grounded. Drawing on the history of ideas and on Lacan's work in particular, John L. Roberts argues that what we mean by trauma has developed over time, and that it is intimately tied with an ontology of the subject; that is to say, what it is to be, and means to be human. He argues that modern subjectivity - as articulated by Heidegger, Levinas, and Lacan - is structurally traumatic, founded in its finitude as self-withdrawal in time, its temporal self-absence becoming the very conditions for agency, truth and knowledge. The book also argues that this fractured temporal horizon - as an effect of an interrupting Otherness or alterity - is obscured through the discourses and technologies of the psy-disciplines (psychiatry, psychology, and psychotherapy). Consideration is given to social, political, and economic consequences of this concealment. Trauma and the Ontology of the Modern Subject will be of enduring interest to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists as well as scholars of philosophy and cultural studies. (shrink)

Princeton University Press, 1974. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (5 MB).

The author poses a question: when a person has a thought, what is it that determines what thought he is having? and, equivalently, what is it that determines what thought he is having. looking for an answer he sketches some general aspects of the problems involved in answering these questions, like the mind/body problem, for example. his conclusion is that the posed questions should be set against the background assumption that thoughts are just internal physical occurrences, and that thoughts are (...) categorized in the same way other mental occurrences are categorized. so the author categorizes them in terms of their introspectible characteristics and in terms of "that" clauses. these classifications can be understood as describing thought in terms of their place in the rational architecture. (shrink)

There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.

In this paper I reflect on the nature of mathematical beauty, and examine the connections between mathematics and the arts. I employ Plutarch’s distinction between the intelligible and the sensible, to compare the beauty of mathematics with the beauties of music, poetry and painting. While the beauty of mathematics is almost exclusively intelligible, and the beauties of these arts primarily sensible, it is pointed out that the latter share with mathematics a certain kind of intelligible beauty. The paper also contains (...) reflections on the formal beauty and timelessness of mathematics, beauty as richness flowing from simplicity, form and content in mathematics, and mathematics and fiction. It concludes with some remarks on the question of why mathematical beauty is so little appreciated by non-mathematicians. (shrink)

Traditionally, there have been two methods of deriving the theorems of geometry: the analytic and the synthetic. While the analytical method is based on the introduction of numerical coordinates, and so on the theory of real numbers, the idea behind the synthetic approach is to furnish the subject of geometry with a purely geometric foundation in which the theorems are then deduced by purely logical means from an initial body of postulates. The most familiar examples of the synthetic geometry are (...) classical Euclidean geometry and the synthetic projective geometry introduced by Desargues in the 17th century and revived and developed by Carnot, Poncelet, Steiner and others during the 19th century. The power of analytic geometry derives very largely from the fact that it permits the methods of the calculus, and, more generally, of mathematical analysis, to be introduced into geometry, leading in particular to differential geometry (a term, by the way, introduced in 1894 by the Italian geometer Luigi Bianchi). That being the case, the idea of a “synthetic” differential geometry seems elusive: how can differential geometry be placed on a “purely geometric” or “axiomatic” foundation when the apparatus of the calculus seems inextricably involved? To my knowledge there have been two attempts to develop a synthetic differential geometry. The first was initiated by Herbert Busemann in the 1940s, building on earlier work of Paul Finsler. Here the idea was to build a differential geometry that, in its author’s words, “requires no derivatives”: the basic objects in Busemann’s approach are not differentiable manifolds, but metric spaces of a certain type in which the notion of a geodesic can be defined in an intrinsic manner. I shall not have anything more to say about this approach. The second approach, that with which I shall be concerned here, was originally proposed in the 1960s by F. W. Lawvere, who was in fact striving to fashion a decisive axiomatic framework for continuum mechanics.. (shrink)

Summary In the trial of Galileo there is a small but significant discrepancy between the text of his condemnation by the Holy Office and the text of his recantation, which has been generally overlooked or ignored. The offence that he was required to recant was more serious than the one of which he had been found guilty. The most plausible explanation seems to be that the two texts were drawn up independently of each other by the Inquisitors and the Pope (...) respectively, and that the latter wished to deal more harshly with Galileo than the former. There is some independent evidence for this supposition. (shrink)

This book provides a systematic and comprehensive survey and evaluation of the problems of incorporating individual and group rights and values into social procedures and judgements, and examines the solutions that have been proposed. The book begins by defending the presence of libertarian requirements in social choice. A framework for incorporating individual rights into social choice is then formally presented, and libertarian conditions are formulated which can be satisfied for all conceivable sets of individual preferences. Further chapters then show how (...) such libertarian conditions can conflict with other well-known social conditions in social choice, in particular the Pareto condition. Resolution approaches to this latter conflict are evaluated, and are shown not to be appropriate for all types of conflict environments. Instead a more pragmatic approach is called for, based on more information regarding the environment from which choice is to be made. (shrink)

Since antiquity, opposed concepts such as the One and the Many, the Finite and the Infinite, and the Absolute and the Relative, have been a driving force in philosophical, scientific, and mathematical thought. Yet they have also given rise to perplexing problems and conceptual paradoxes which continue to haunt scientists and philosophers. In Oppositions and Paradoxes, John L. Bell explains and investigates the paradoxes and puzzles that arise out of conceptual oppositions in physics and mathematics. In the process, Bell (...) not only motivates abstract conceptual thinking about the paradoxes at issue, he also offers a compelling introduction to central ideas in such otherwise-difficult topics as non-Euclidean geometry, relativity, and quantum physics. These paradoxes are often as fun as they are flabbergasting. Consider, for example, the famous Tristram Shandy paradox: an immortal man composing an autobiography so slowly as to require a year of writing to describe each day of his life and he would, if he had infinite time, presumably never complete the work, although no individual part of it would remain unwritten. Or imagine an English professor who time-travels back to 1599 to offer a printing of Hamlet to Shakespeare, so as to help the Bard overcome writer's block and author the play which will centuries later inspire an English professor to travel back in time. These and many other paradoxes straddle the boundary between physics and metaphysics, and demonstrate the hidden difficulty in many of our most basic concepts. (shrink)

Pollock describes an exciting theory of rationality and its partial implementation in OSCAR, a computer system whose descendants will literally be persons.

Chisholm's ontological objective is the reductionist one of translating statements which appear to be about propositions and generic events into statements about states of affairs, denying the existence of concrete events altogether. The paper questions this program by criticising the notion of concretization on which Chisholm heavily relies. It is argued that there are no convincing arguments in favor of eliminative reductionism. Translability of statements about one kind of entity into statements about another kind of entity has nothing to do (...) with what exists. (shrink)

Chisholm's ontological objective is the reductionist one of translating statements which appear to be about propositions and generic events into statements about states of affairs, denying the existence of concrete events altogether. The paper questions this program by criticising the notion of concretization on which Chisholm heavily relies. It is argued that there are no convincing arguments in favor of eliminative reductionism. Translability of statements about one kind of entity into statements about another kind of entity has nothing to do (...) with what exists. (shrink)

Thirty years ago, the Arab Oil Embargo caused us to stop taking gasoline for granted and caused the author to start teaching students about the importance of energy in our lives. This retrospective shows the same general patterns discerned from a 20-year retrospective a decade ago: a sharp decrease in energy use following each of the two energy crises of the 1970s and a decline in the rate at which energy use increased in the years following. Yet the United States (...) has made little progress to wean itself from its fossil fuels energy diet, and there is little expectation that this will change in the next 50 years. (shrink)

In this book Pollock deals with the subject of probabilistic reasoning, making general philosophical sense of objective probabilities and exploring their ...